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A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REGIME 
BASED ON INSTRUMENTAL VALUES 
ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. By Donald A. Dripps.1 Praeger 
Publishers. 2003. xix + 295 pp. $85.95. 
Tracey Maclin2
INTRODUCTION 
To listen to those who teach and study American constitu-
tional criminal procedure, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
this field is a mess. Scholars from different political perspectives 
share the view that the Court’s criminal procedure rulings are of-
ten inconsistent, out of touch with the real world of law en-
forcement needs, and unduly protect the rights of guilty defen-
dants without enhancing the freedom and liberty of innocent 
persons.3 This complaint is not confined to law professors who 
 1. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 3. For critical commentary on the state of Fourth Amendment law, see, e.g., Akhil 
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757–58 (1994) 
(“The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court 
has said in the last half century—that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and 
probable cause for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of illegally obtained evi-
dence—is initially plausible but ultimately misguided. . . . Meanwhile, sensible rules that 
the Amendment clearly does lay down or presuppose . . . are ignored by the Justices. . . . 
Criminals go free, while honest citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little 
or no real remedy. If there are good reasons for these and countless other odd results, the 
Court has not provided them.”); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985) (“The fourth amendment is the Supreme 
Court’s tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the ‘Breth-
ren’ in such a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them more pro-
foundly stuck.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 349 (1974) (“For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth 
amendment is not the Supreme Court’s most successful product.”). For critical comments 
on the Court’s Self-Incrimination Clause and police interrogation cases, see, e.g., Akhil 
Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (1995) (arguing that “courts and com-
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are unburdened by the responsibility of deciding cases and writ-
ing opinions that are consistent with precedents that are decades 
old. Justice Scalia, a member of the Court for almost twenty 
years, has on more than a few occasions (usually in dissenting or 
concurring opinions) criticized his colleagues for issuing rulings 
that contradict earlier cases, or are devoid of principled reason-
ing and common sense.4
Professor Donald Dripps shares the view that the law of 
criminal procedure “is in disarray” and “highly dysfunctional” 
(p. xiii).5 Dripps believes that the Supreme Court’s “legal doc-
mentators have been unable to deduce what the privilege is for, [and] they have failed to 
define its scope in the most logical and sensible way.”); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mis-
take, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 976 (2001) (“As things stand now, from almost any plausible 
set of premises, police interrogation is badly regulated. Because of Dickerson [v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)], it will continue to be badly regulated for a long time to 
come.”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 188 (1998) 
(arguing that under the modern Court’s interpretation, “Miranda no longer will safe-
guard Fifth Amendment values, prevent coercive interrogations, or assist courts in avoid-
ing more difficult determinations of voluntariness”). 
 4. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444–45 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (complaining that “Justices whose votes are needed to compose [the Dickerson] ma-
jority are on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Con-
stitution. And so, to justify today’s agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant 
new, if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law. As the Court chooses 
to describe that principle, statutes of Congress can be discarded, not only when what they 
prescribe violates the Constitution, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision 
of this Court that ‘announces a constitutional rule.’”) (citations omitted); California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not regard today’s hold-
ing as some momentous departure, but rather as merely the continuation of an inconsis-
tent jurisprudence that has been with us for years.”); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 
500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One hears the complaint, nowadays, that 
the Fourth Amendment has become constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the 
career criminal (through the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but the ordinary citi-
zen remotely if at all. By failing to protect the innocent arrestee, today’s opinion rein-
forces that view. . . . In my view, this is the image of a system of justice that has lost its 
ancient sense of priority, a system that few Americans would recognize as our own.”). 
 5. Dripps proffers three statistics to illustrate the practical failures in the criminal 
justice system: First, “half of all arrests don’t lead to convictions.” This fact, according to 
Dripps, must mean that “the police detect many guilty offenders the courts fail to con-
vict, that the police arrest a great many innocent people, or that arrest is routinely used 
as a kind of informal punishment.” Dripps believes that “some combination of these 
phenomena explains the nonconviction rate” (p. xiii). 
Second, “25% of the conclusive DNA tests performed at the request of the police 
exonerate the suspect.” This obviously means that a significant number of innocent peo-
ple have been ensnarled in the criminal justice system. Dripps plausibly theorizes that the 
factors that implicate innocent persons in cases where DNA test can be performed—
“misidentification, poor defense work, prosecutorial misconduct, informant perjury, and 
false confessions—are at work in other cases too.” The upshot is that the criminal adjudi-
catory process “is being asked to negate far more false accusations than criminal justice 
professions previously believed” (id.). 
Finally, “[a]lthough social science data suggest that black and white usage rates of 
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trine is in large measure responsible for the failure of the crimi-
nal-procedure revolution,” and contends that “current doctrine 
does not reflect prevailing (and justified) values about the crimi-
nal process” (p. xiv). To prove his claim, Dripps has written a 
book that expertly identifies the flaws, inconsistencies and mis-
steps of the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure cases dat-
ing back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. About 
Guilt and Innocence: The Origins, Development, and Future of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure is a comprehensive and 
thoughtful critique of the Court’s criminal procedure jurispru-
dence. While Dripps surveys the entire field of constitutional 
criminal procedure, the book pays close attention to the Court’s 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases. Topics such as search 
and seizure, the exclusionary rule, police interrogation and the 
right to counsel receive scrupulous analysis by Dripps. 
This book is not casual or beach reading. Dripps’ legal 
analysis is meticulously researched. Parts of the book discuss 
constitutional law cases and theories that are rarely taught (or 
even mentioned) in a standard criminal procedure course. A 
firm knowledge of constitutional law is essential to understand 
many of Dripps’ arguments.6 Although the book is intellectually 
rigorous, it is not a book that should be confined to the book-
shelves of law professors. The Justices of the Supreme Court 
should read this book. The issues discussed by Dripps are ad-
dressed by judges—both federal and state—on a regular basis. 
Moreover, the impact and meaning of many of the rulings dis-
cussed in the book—Terry v. Ohio,7 Miranda v. Arizona 8 and 
Strickland v. Washington9—remain highly controversial among 
marijuana and cocaine are roughly comparable, blacks are five times more likely than 
whites to be convicted of these offenses. Police decisions to stop, search and arrest, and 
prosecutorial decisions to charge, clearly have a massively disproportionate impact on 
black Americans” (p. xiv). For two thoughtful views on the role of race in the criminal 
process and the inequalities inherent in the criminal justice system, see RANDALL 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) and MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN 
NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995). 
 6. The only frustrating part of the book was the endnotes. Professor George Tho-
mas is right about the use of endnotes, particularly in a book like this one, where the 
endnotes often contain a large amount of useful information. See George C. Thomas III, 
An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 808 n.4 
(1995) (“Is it not late in the day for endnotes? Having become accustomed to footnotes 
in this computer age, the endnotes were quite frustrating, all the more so because readers 
will want to examine [the author’s] notes carefully.”). Of course, Professor Thomas’ own 
book on Double Jeopardy, a fine piece of legal scholarship, also has endnotes. See 
GEORGE C. THOMAS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW (1998). 
 7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 9. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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the judiciary and its observers. When addressing these contro-
versies, Dripps offers a fair and balanced presentation of the op-
posing legal and policy choices confronting the Court. To be 
sure, Dripps has specific (and pointed) opinions about the 
Court’s jurisprudence. But he does not let his own views stand in 
the way of educating his readers. 
My review will proceed as follows. Part I provides a general 
overview of Dripps’ book. Dripps discusses so many cases and 
topics that a fair and detailed review of the book’s various as-
pects and premises would go beyond the scope of this project. 
Therefore, Part I simply highlights Dripps’ core arguments. 
Part II, in contrast, is a detailed discussion of Dripps’ analysis of 
the Court’s confession cases. This part also includes a description 
of Dripps’ proposal to regulate police interrogation and my cri-
tique of his proposal. 
PART I: THE BOOK ITSELF 
A. THE ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
THE FIRST BIG MISTAKE AND REJECTION OF INCORPORATION 
THEORY 
About Guilt and Innocence discusses a wide range of crimi-
nal procedure issues and several hundred judicial decisions. Al-
though Dripps directs most of his analysis on the Court’s Fourth, 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rulings, this focus is dictated as 
much by the Court as it is by Dripps himself. Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment cases remain a staple of the Court’s docket 
and these are the cases taught in the standard criminal procedure 
course in American law schools.10
 10. Each Term, the Court decides a number of interesting cases involving criminal 
procedure issues. In recent years, the Court has decided several important constitutional 
issues in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (federal 
sentencing guidelines are subject to the jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment); 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (mandatory state sentencing guidelines sys-
tem violated the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirements); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (execution of individuals under 18 years of age at the time of their capital 
crimes prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(executions of mentally retarded defendants prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). The 
Court has also addressed the President’s authority to detain an American citizen as an 
“enemy combatant.” See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (explaining that al-
though Congress authorized the President to detain enemy combatants in the narrow 
circumstances of this case, due process principles require that a citizen held as an enemy 
combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual basis of his deten-
tion before a neutral decisionmaker). Readers of Dripps’ book will not find a discussion 
!MACLIN-REVIEWACRIMINALPROCEDUREREGIMEBASEDON.DOC 5/9/2006 5:31:44 PM 
2005] BOOK REVIEWS 201 
 
The book is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter is 
entitled “Constitutional Criminal Procedure from the Adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to 1947: The Strange Career of 
Fundamental Fairness.” As the title indicates, this chapter intro-
duces the reader to the Court’s initial venture into constitutional 
criminal procedure in the wake of the Civil War and the Recon-
struction Amendments. In 1884, in Hurtado v. California, the 
Court adopted a fundamental fairness test to determine whether 
state criminal procedures satisfied the demands of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.11 The specific issue in 
Hurtado was whether due process required a grand jury indict-
ment to initiate a state murder criminal charge, as is required by 
the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause in federal prosecu-
tions. The Hurtado Court held that an ex parte information satis-
fied due process requirements. Due process, according to Hur-
tado, only required those “fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil political institutions.”12 
And due process emphasizes the “substance” of fundamental 
rules of law, rather than the “forms and modes of attainment” 
dictated by the law.13
 Dripps asserts that Hurtado’s embrace of substantive due 
process was a momentous mistake. He contends that an “instru-
mental theory of procedural due process offers the most appro-
priate doctrinal premise for constitutional criminal procedure” 
(p. 3). While arguing that substantive due process was the wrong 
tool to use in order to judge the constitutional validity of state 
criminal procedures, Dripps explains that a substantive due 
process model did not pose practical obstacles to state police in-
vestigations or trial procedures. “Quite the contrary, until 1923, 
the Court did not reverse a state criminal conviction because of a 
due process violation” (p. 15). As Dripps recognizes, the Court’s 
consistent refusal to overturn state criminal convictions did not 
necessarily reflect a lack of nerve by the Court. This was the pe-
riod better known by lawyers and law students as the Lochner 
of these specific topics. As Dripps notes in his introduction, the manuscript of his book 
was prepared before September 11, 2001. Furthermore, no author could discuss all of the 
Court’s many cases involving criminal procedure issues in a one hundred and eighty-eight 
page book. In its current edition, the most popular casebook on criminal procedure is 
seventeen hundred and sixteen pages in length. See YALE KAMISAR, ET AL., MODERN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS (11th ed. 2005) [hereinafter 
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. 
 11. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884). 
 12. Id. at 535. 
 13. Id. at 532. 
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era,14 in which the Court “engaged in the frequent and capricious 
nullification of state economic regulations on substantive due 
process grounds” (p. 15). This was also the same period when 
the Court “took a noticeably pro-defense approach to federal 
criminal cases” (p. 15). 
According to Dripps, the Lochner-era Court’s activist 
stance in federal criminal cases and economic regulation cases, 
but refusal to overturn state criminal convictions “was neither 
unprincipled nor disingenuous” (p. 20). Rather, “[t]he guiding 
principle under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause 
was constitutional withdrawal of state power to impair funda-
mental liberties. The judicial refusal to intervene in state criminal 
procedure reflected a sincere belief that in criminal cases, proce-
dural protections, except of the most basic sort, are not funda-
mental, as are the rights to hold private property and enter into 
contracts” (p. 20). 
A subtle shift occurred between 1923 and 1947 when, in 
Dripps’ view, the Court expanded the constitutional rights of the 
accused. “During this period, the cases in which the Court re-
versed state convictions on due process grounds involved either 
grave doubts about the reliability of the trial verdict, or the op-
pressive abuse of official power in obtaining evidence against the 
accused” (p. 23). But this period was not the start of a “criminal 
procedure revolution.” Instead, the Court’s rulings were con-
fined to reversing especially disturbing state convictions. “The 
Court made no effort to reach beyond the case to be decided, no 
attempt to reform state criminal justice in any general way” (p. 
23). 
Chapter Two of the book outlines the Court’s initial reluc-
tance to apply the Bill of Rights’ procedural safeguards to the 
 14. Lochner, of course, stands for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Legal 
scholarship analyzing Lochner and its impact is abundant. For a recent and informative 
reappraisal of Lochner itself and legal commentary on Lochner, see David E. Bernstein, 
The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). While the Lochner-era 
Court upheld a robust version of freedom of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment 
for bakers in New York, that Court “was unwilling to protect (or, more precisely, to au-
thorize the federal government to protect) liberty of person and freedom of contract 
when it came to black Americans in the South—the original intended beneficiaries of 
Reconstruction.” Pamela S. Karlan, Contracting the Thirteenth Amendment: Hodges v. 
United States, 783, 784–85 (2005) (discussing history and ruling in Hodges v. United 
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which ruled that Congress did not have the authority pursuant 
to the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to criminalize physical violence 
designed to intimidate black lumbermen into breaching labor contracts). 
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states’ criminal justice procedures. The start of the chapter has a 
lengthy and scholarly discussion on the adoption and ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, with a special focus on whether 
the amendment intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. 
In this section, Dripps considers debates in Congress, as well as 
the work and arguments of nineteenth century jurists, lawyers 
and legal academics. Like many scholars before him, Dripps is 
skeptical of the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
the Bill of Rights binding on the states. He notes that the ratifi-
cation process “apparently never considered the incorporation 
question” (p. 33). Dripps’ research also reveals that lawyers and 
judges in the post-Reconstruction period “recoiled from equat-
ing the Bill of Rights criminal-procedure provisions with ‘privi-
leges or immunities’ or with ‘due process’” (p. 34). The most that 
can be said in favor of the total incorporation theory is that it 
“has not been disproved or refuted” (p. 34). In Dripps’ view, it is 
“fair to say that the thesis that a majority of those involved in 
framing and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment intended to 
apply the Bill of Rights to the states has not been proved and 
seems on the whole very doubtful” (p. 34). 
Putting aside the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
framers, Dripps explains that by the start of the 1960’s, the Court 
had not yet embraced incorporation theory as a remedy for the 
problems some saw in the states’ criminal justice systems. Al-
though Wolf v. Colorado ruled in 1948 that the Fourth Amend-
ment was a fundamental right, and was thus binding on the 
states,15 Dripps appears to side with the view that Wolf’s refusal 
to impose the exclusionary rule on the states made the Fourth 
Amendment a dead letter in state police investigations. The sub-
sequent rulings in Rochin v. California and Irvine v. California 
confirmed that a fundamental rights regime would not impose 
any obstacles for state police officials determined to ignore or 
skirt Fourth Amendment protections that Wolf held were bind-
ing on the states.16 The same was true for state police interroga-
 15. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 16. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), police officers illegally and forcibly 
entered Rochin’s home. The officers found Rochin sitting partly dressed on a bed, where 
his wife was also lying. After Rochin swallowed several capsules that were located on a 
table, a struggle ensued between the officers and Rochin. Rochin was taken to a hospital 
and the officers ordered a doctor to pump Rochin’s stomach. The stomach pumping in-
duced vomiting and produced two capsules, which proved to be morphine. The Court 
held that admission of the capsules as evidence to convict Rochin of morphine possession 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process was vio-
lated because the Court found that the officers’ conduct “shock[ed] the conscience.” Ro-
chin, 342 U.S. at 172. In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), officers made repeated 
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tion practices and the provision of counsel for indigent defen-
dants facing state felony charges. The author closes Chapter Two 
with a brief discussion on why, during its early years, the Warren 
Court did not use the Equal Protection Clause to combat the 
obvious racial discrimination routinely practiced by police offi-
cers, prosecutors and judges. “[D]iscrimination in the criminal 
justice system, in contrast to education and public facilities, was 
de facto, not de jure. There was no statute commanding police 
abuse or unjust conviction of blacks that could be struck down 
by a stroke of the judicial pen” (p. 43).17
illegal entries into Irvine’s home and secretly installed a microphone, and then used the 
microphone to obtain knowledge of his gambling activities. Although Justice Jackson’s 
opinion for the Court conceded that “[F]ew police measures have come to our attention 
that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle 
declared by the Fourth Amendment,” 347 U.S. at 1132, the Court nevertheless concluded 
that this police conduct did not violate due process norms, and held that the evidence 
thus obtained was admissible at Irvine’s trial. The Irvine Court distinguished Rochin by 
explaining that the facts in Irvine did not involve any coercion, violence or brutality. For 
a sharp criticism of the Court’s reasoning and logic in Wolf, Rochin and Irvine, see Yale 
Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal 
Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1123, 1127 (1959) (“Wolf teaches us that . . . some ‘fun-
damental’ rights are less ‘fundamental’ that others, less ‘immutable’ than others, less ‘ba-
sic’ than others. That evidence is not to be excluded unless it was obtained in violation of 
sub-minimal standards. . . . And Irvine teaches us that some ‘incredible’ and ‘flagrant’ 
violations of due process are less ‘incredible’ and ‘flagrant’ than others and only when 
such violations are sufficiently ‘incredible’ and ‘flagrant,’ do we exclude their fruits. . . . 
[T]he reasoning in Irvine is about as unpalatable as the result. To exclude the evidence 
on the ground that it involved a more serious and more shocking violation than did Wolf 
‘would leave the rule so indefinite that no state court could know what it should rule to 
keep its processes on solid constitutional ground.’”) (footnote omitted). 
 17. Professor Dripps is correct to note that the criminal justice system was plagued 
by de facto discrimination, which was much more difficult to combat judicially, especially 
after the Court’s 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (establishing 
that a racially disproportionate impact is not enough, by itself, to declare a law unconsti-
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause). Other scholars have argued, however, that 
the Warren Court was undeniably influenced by equal protection concerns when decid-
ing a number of its criminal procedure decisions. See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren 
Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1969) (“The Court’s concern 
with criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of the struggle for civil 
rights. . . . If the Court’s espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, it re-
quired not only that the poor Negro be permitted to vote and to attend school with 
whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as well as 
possess, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime.”); LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 386 (2000) (explaining that 
the Warren Court took seriously its commitment to equality for African-Americans, who 
“were disproportionately affected by whatever abuses or inequities there were in the 
criminal justice system”); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 13 (1970) 
(“Having outlawed Jim Crow, the Court had to humble John Law. Many of its landmark 
decisions on behalf of criminal defendants involved Negroes, often after they had been 
caught up in that ultimate of racial trials, a prosecution for raping a white woman. Thus, 
it was apparent that a moving force behind the Supreme Court’s effort to safeguard 
criminal suspects was its commitment to protect the rights of Negroes.”). 
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B. ANOTHER MISTAKE: MAKING THE BILL OF RIGHTS  
BINDING ON THE STATES, AND THE CONSERVATIVE  
REACTION TO INCORPORATION 
Scholars who closely follow the Court’s criminal procedure 
cases will especially enjoy the third and fourth chapters of the 
book. Chapter Three is entitled “Revolution and Reaction,” and 
is written in a “summary fashion, ranging widely but necessarily 
not comprehensively over the entire field” of criminal procedure 
(p. 69). Chapter Four is a detailed discussion and assessment of 
the Court’s interrogation cases. Both chapters are well-written 
and persuasive in their critiques. 
In Chapter Three, Dripps describes the Warren Court’s dis-
satisfaction with fundamental rights analysis and its move to in-
corporate most of the Bill of Rights’ procedural safeguards to 
the states. But this chapter also explains the reactions of the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts to the perceived activist rulings of 
the Warren Court. The more conservative Justices of the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts—utilizing what Dripps calls “conservative 
balancing”—curtailed (and in some cases eliminated) the consti-
Although Dripps notes that the Warrant Court did not use the Equal Protection 
Clause to address the racism that pervaded the criminal justice systems of many jurisdic-
tions, he does not deny that, in the past, the Court generally and the Warren Court spe-
cifically, did pay close attention to racial concerns when constructing criminal procedure 
doctrine. Recent legal scholarship has identified a direct link between the Court’s crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence and concerns about racist criminal justice practices. See, e.g., 
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 48 (2000) (“the linkage between the birth of modern criminal procedure and south-
ern black defendants is no fortuity”); KimForde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through the 
Lens of Race, 21 J. LAW & POL. 1, 12 (2005) (assessing the Court’s criminal procedure 
cases “requires understanding their racial implications”). Indeed, Professor Corinna Bar-
rett Lain has argued that: 
[O]ne thing the burgeoning civil rights movement did was give the Supreme 
Court a reason to distrust the states, especially on matters of criminal proce-
dure. Yet the nation’s growing interest in protecting black Americans did some-
thing else too: it gave the Court a reason to take an interest in criminal defen-
dants. Whether or not the Supreme Court was consciously thinking about racial 
discrimination under the facts of Mapp, it knew from prior cases that the most 
egregious abuses of police power were perpetrated against blacks, and that to 
the extent its ruling corrected an injustice, it would have the most impact there. 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s 
Roe in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1388 (2004) (foot-
notes omitted); id. at 1396 (asserting that the Court was “no doubt” thinking about the 
plight of black defendants in Southern courts when it decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963): “Gideon happened to be white, but the fact that only Southern states 
had refused to provide an attorney to indigent felony defendants made the connection 
impossible to ignore”). See also Carol S. Steiker, Introduction, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
STORIES viii (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (“The most striking theme that emerges from 
the stories behind the [Court’s criminal procedure] cases—far more than the opinions 
themselves suggest—is the intersection of the criminal procedure revolution and the 
struggle for racial equality, especially in the South.”). 
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tutional protections of criminal suspects and defendants, without 
expressly overruling the landmark decisions of the Warren 
Court. As Dripps nicely describes it, “[t]he current model in 
criminal procedure is conservative balancing, in which the Bill of 
Rights procedural safeguards are applicable to both state and 
federal cases but are qualified at every turn by the felt necessi-
ties of law enforcement” (p. 49). 
The first half of Chapter Three summarily describes how 
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments have been interpreted, 
first by the Warren Court, and then by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts. A few examples illustrate the incisiveness of 
Dripps’ analysis. On the Fourth Amendment, Dripps asserts that 
“the Warren Court basically disincorporated the Fourth 
Amendment in Terry v. Ohio” when it approved stop and frisk 
police tactics on less than probable cause (p. 51).18 Another in-
stance of the Warren Court’s favoring of law enforcement inter-
ests concerned the government’s use of informants. In a series of 
cases, the Court ruled that no search occurs under the Fourth 
Amendment when secret spies are planted in homes and other 
private places to monitor conversations, although one year later 
the Court would rule that telephone wiretapping is a search. If 
the use of informants without probable cause or warrants is not a 
search rests on the theory “that speakers assume the risk that 
their words will be repeated, why does the fact that the inter-
locutor is a spy make any difference? If the risk that one’s audi-
ence includes a spy suffices to make conversations unprivate, the 
government should have the right to tap telephones at will, for 
there is always the chance that one party may betray the other” 
(p. 52). 
Later, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts narrowed the defi-
nition of probable cause and confined application of the exclu-
sionary rule to a few discrete types of intentional violations of 
the Fourth Amendment. In Dripps’ words, “in effect [United 
States v.] Leon 19 holds that the Constitution can be violated 
 18. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), held that where an officer had reasonable sus-
picion that a suspect was contemplating a robbery, it was reasonable to frisk the suspect 
to determine whether he had a weapon on his person; this type of search was permissible 
on less than probable cause because it promoted officer safety and was limited in scope 
and duration. 
 19. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment’s exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of evidence in the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief obtained by officers relying in good faith on a search warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate which is ultimately found to be invalid). 
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without any sanction or remedy whatsoever” (p. 53), and “when 
the nearly toothless jaws of the exclusionary rule do threaten a 
conviction in serious cases, a tolerant attitude toward police per-
jury can still save the day for the government” (p. 48). In sum, 
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary 
rule has, according to Dripps, produced “the worst of all Fourth 
Amendment worlds, in which the Amendment is hard to trigger, 
harder to violate when it applies, virtually impossible to enforce 
when it is violated, and yet is thought of as the Constitution’s 
primary, almost exclusive, regulation of the police” (p. 54). 
On the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment’s 
Self-Incrimination Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s Right to 
Counsel Clause, Dripps notes that the Warren Court’s rulings in 
Escobedo v. Illinois 20 and Gideon v. Wainwright 21 initially indi-
cated that the Court was prepared to impose significant reforms 
on state police practices and adjudicatory procedures. Escobedo 
suggested that the Court was ready “to live with the loss of con-
fessions that would have accompanied extending the right to 
counsel to the process of police interrogation” (p. 55). But the 
result in Miranda ultimately showed that the Warren Court was 
not willing to pay such a high cost. Indeed, “as a matter of Sixth 
Amendment law, Miranda marked a major victory for the gov-
ernment. Police interrogation was saved from the jaws of Esco-
bedo” (p. 57). 
Dripps also has some unkind words for Gideon,22 a ruling 
that “aroused wide support, and even enthusiasm, almost from 
the moment it was announced in 1963.”23 What was controversial 
about Gideon was not the result—“only a few Southern states 
still refused to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in felony 
cases” (p. 56)—but how far the Court was prepared to go to en-
sure that an indigent defendant received more than merely 
someone with a law degree to provide “the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defense”24 as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
 20. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (emphasizing the specific facts, holding that suspect had 
been denied Sixth Amendment right to counsel when, during police interrogation, sus-
pect was not warned of right to silence and was denied opportunity to consult with a law-
yer). 
 21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that states must provide free defense counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants charged with felonies). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Michael B. Mushlin, Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What Does The Right To 
Counsel Guarantee Today?, 10 PACE L. REV. 327, 327 (1990). Professor Mushlin notes 
that even former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, a noted critic of the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure revolution, has praised the result in Gideon. Id. at 328 n.4. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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Strickland v. Washington,25 decided in 1984, showed that the 
Burger Court was not willing to go very far. To prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, a de-
fendant must prove that counsel’s mistakes caused a “break-
down in the adversary process that renders the result unreli-
able.”26 As Dripps explains, Strickland’s “demanding test” seems 
purposefully designed to deter successful effective assistance of 
counsel claims: 
How is an indigent convict supposed to show on appeal that 
his overworked public defender could have won the case by a 
more thorough investigation? If such a convict had the re-
sources to mount a thorough post-conviction investigation 
and support the appeal with affidavits, he wouldn’t have been 
represented by the public defender in the first place. And if 
the investigation were inadequate, there would be no way to 
prove exculpatory theories based on the very record alleged 
to be incomplete or misleading. Strickland simply presumes 
that the defendant convicted without a thorough investigation 
by the defense is guilty (p. 58). 
The reaction of the “law-and-order” Justices of the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts was not confined to cutting back the pro-
tections afforded by the Bill of Rights. The first section of Chap-
ter three shows that “the Bill of Rights now totally dominates 
the criminal procedure landscape” (p. 48), and the closing sec-
tion of the chapter convincingly argues that, under the 
Rehnquist Court, “due process and equal protection have fallen 
into virtual desuetude” (p. 48). The atrophy of due process and 
equal protection norms in criminal cases was not accidental. 
In theory, substantive due process offers criminal suspects 
and defendants protection for their “liberty” that is independent 
of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. In Schmerber v. 
California, the Warren Court left open whether certain police 
practices might violate substantive due process.27 Dripps notes, 
however, that since Schmerber the Court has not overturned a 
conviction on substantive due process grounds. “In effect, free-
standing substantive due process analysis in criminal cases has 
ceased” (p. 59). 
 25. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 26. Id. at 687. 
 27. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 n.4 (1966). 
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Nor has the modern Court been willing to seriously scruti-
nize state criminal trials under a procedural due process model. 
Under the “instrumental” procedural due process model envi-
sioned by Dripps, judges would have the power to invalidate 
“antiquated [criminal trial] procedures that run a high risk of er-
ror,” and could mandate additional “procedural safeguards be-
yond those known at common law” (p. 60). An instrumental due 
process approach would follow the three-part test announced in 
Mathews v. Eldridge for determining the amount of process that 
is required before a constitutionally protected interest can be 
terminated by state officials.28 Thus, an instrumental approach 
would require the judiciary “to consider the weight of the indi-
vidual’s interest, the risk of error, and the cost to the govern-
ment of additional procedural safeguards” (p. 60). 
Besides the ruling in Ake v. Oklahoma, which Dripps con-
tends “openly consulted the Mathews factors,”29 the Rehnquist 
Court has not been overly concerned with enforcing procedural 
due process norms in criminal cases, let alone embracing the 
type of instrumental due process model proposed by Dripps. 
“Despite all the conservative rhetoric about criminal procedure 
being about guilt and innocence, judicial restraint has proved 
more valuable to the current Court than reliability in criminal 
cases” (p. 61). The irony in the Court’s position is that in crimi-
nal cases instrumental concerns, such as reliability of outcome 
and the dignity interests of suspects and defendants, are dis-
counted, while in “administrative cases involving far lesser li-
abilities—such as suspension from public school or discharge 
 28. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court explained that 
“due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedures; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335 (citation omitted). 
 29. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Ake was a capital case in which the sanity of the defendant 
was a significant aspect of the trial, and the state presented evidence of the defendant’s 
future dangerousness to society during the sentencing proceeding to determine whether 
the death penalty should be imposed. The Court held that “when a defendant demon-
strates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant fac-
tor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent 
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, prepa-
ration, and presentation of the defense.” Id. at 83. Commentators have agreed with 
Dripps that the result in Ake is grounded on procedural due process norms. See, e.g., 
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 108 (“Although one might maintain 
that a right to a court-appointed psychiatrist under certain circumstances is implicit in the 
right to counsel or implements or effectuates that right, Ake is not written that way. It is 
a free-standing procedural due process decision. . . .”), citing DRIPPS (p. 143). 
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from public employment—Mathews controls and the focus is on 
instrumental reliability” (p. 62). 
Finally, the Equal Protection Clause has not required any 
fundamental changes in state adjudicatory procedures. The main 
reason is the Court’s narrow interpretation of the equal protec-
tion clause. Disparate racial impact alone does not violate the 
Constitution. Defendants who are affected by racial bias in the 
system must prove purposeful discrimination by state officials. 
Because of this judge-made impediment, “[t]he practical diffi-
culty with claims of racial discrimination in criminal justice is the 
inherently difficult problem of distinguishing disparate impact 
from invidious discrimination” (p. 63). 
Dripps does acknowledge one bright spot in the modern 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—Batson v. Kentucky.30 In 
that case, the Court held that prosecutors could no longer use 
their peremptory challenges to remove blacks from juries. The 
result in Batson was prompted by at least two factors: First, 
overwhelming and persuasive evidence apparently convinced the 
Justices that pre-Batson law “had the effect of imposing all-white 
juries on a great many black defendants. The justices surely ap-
preciated how much damage this practice did to the appearance 
of justice” (p. 65). Second, the ruling in Batson did not require 
the exclusion of probative evidence of the defendant’s guilt, nor 
did it result in releasing a guilty defendant. 
Putting Batson aside, successful equal protection claims by 
criminal suspects and defendants are as rare as a three dollar bill. 
United States v. Armstrong 31 typifies the Court’s deliberate indif-
ference to claims of racial injustice. In Armstrong, a group of 
black defendants claimed that they had been subject to selective 
prosecution, and sought discovery from the federal prosecutor to 
support their claim. After the Court of Appeals ruled that the 
defendants were entitled to pursue discovery, the Supreme 
Court reversed and held that discovery was permissible only 
where the defendants had proven (before discovery) the essen-
tial elements of a selective prosecution claim.32 “How the defense 
 30. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 31. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
 32. Under the Court’s analysis, the defense must show both a discriminatory effect 
and purpose by governmental actors. Id. at 465. Under Armstrong, “[t]o establish a dis-
criminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated individu-
als of a different race were not prosecuted.” Id. at 457. Magnanimously, the Court re-
served the question of whether a criminal defendant must satisfy the similarly situated 
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is supposed to discover evidence of discrimination without dis-
covery is, of course, a bit of a mystery” (p. 65). 
In sum, Dripps laments that modern criminal procedure 
does very little, if anything, to guarantee “decent and reliable 
police investigations, fair trials, and equal justice” (p. 50). As he 
sees it, “[s]ubstantive due process review is a virtual dead letter 
under the ‘shock the conscience’ test; procedural due process is 
more concerned with history than with reliability; and [outside of 
the circumscribed area protected by Batson], the equal protec-
tion clause imposes practically no restraint on police and prose-
cutors” (p. 69). At the same time, conservative balancing by the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts “has reduced the Bill of Rights 
provisions to flexible notions of reasonable police practices or 
fair adjudicatory procedures” (p. 69). Finally, Dripps believes 
that the existing jurisprudence “still does too much to protect the 
guilty” (p. 69). 
C. THE COURT’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE  
IS UNPRINCIPLED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In Chapters Three and Four, Dripps summarizes the con-
tradictions and doctrinal flaws in the modern Court’s criminal 
procedure cases. In Chapters Five and Six, Dripps’ target is con-
stitutional theory. Specifically, in Chapter Five he provides a 
theoretical critique of the fundamental fairness, selective incor-
poration and conservative balancing models utilized by the 
Court over the last century. Dripps asserts that the Court’s cur-
rent criminal procedure doctrine “is not, as a regime, character-
ized by the principled consistency required of an enduring body 
of constitutional law” (p. 99). He evaluates the Court’s jurispru-
dence using a conventionalist theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion and instrumental concerns, such as proportionate police in-
vestigative practices33 and reliable adjudicatory procedures. 
Dripps argues that a properly functioning criminal justice system 
would “institutionalize the instrumental theory of criminal pro-
cedure” (p. 110). Unless forced to do so by other constitutional 
requirement in a case where the prosecutor admits a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 469 
n.3. 
 33. According to Dripps, “[i]nvestigative practices that injure individuals can be 
justified by the positive purposes of the criminal law, but only to the extent that the in-
vestigative practice is likely to prevent an imminent or continuing offense or to punish an 
offense through the adjudication process. Which investigative practices implicate the ex-
clusivity principle, and how likely they must be of securing a conviction, are important 
questions that may depend on other values. The instrumental theory, however, has the 
virtue of framing the issue appropriately” (p. 107). 
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provisions, an instrumental model of criminal procedure would 
“not place obstacles in the way of punishing the guilty except to 
the extent that those obstacles protect the innocent” (p. 110). Fi-
nally, an instrumental approach “should serve rule-of-law values 
by expressing the governing law as clearly and comprehensively 
as circumstances permit” (p. 110). 
The following is a summary of Dripps’ numerous argu-
ments. First, Dripps believes that a fundamental fairness regime 
was both too vague and heavy-handed. A fundamental fairness 
model was too open-ended because: 
The Court never narrowed the scope of the normative inquiry 
into fundamental fairness. Fundamental fairness could be a 
matter of minimizing errors, or of minimizing erroneous con-
victions, or of preserving individual dignity. Neutral principles 
could not possibly have emerged from such an open-ended 
inquiry. Similarly situated defendants would inevitably be 
treated differently. Law enforcement officers and lower court 
judges would not have the guidance they need to deal with the 
steady volume of criminal cases implicating constitutional 
standards (p. 112). 
The fundamental fairness regime of the early twentieth cen-
tury also “amounted to a constitutional chancellor’s foot” to 
strike down state convictions at the apparent whim of a majority 
of the Justices. 
The vacuity of the fundamental fairness approach made it as 
unjust as it was illegitimate. By permitting all values to com-
pete in every case, the fundamental fairness standard ne-
glected the dominant value in criminal procedure—the avoid-
ance of erroneous punishment. At least through mid-century, 
American criminal process was in many states characterized 
by arbitrary arrest and search, third-degree interrogation tac-
tics, and unreliable trial procedures. Racism was pervasive. It 
was unexceptional for an indigent black to be tried without 
counsel, or by all-white jury, or convicted on the force of a 
confession secured by a long bout of secret questioning. 
  The assumption underlying the Court’s approach, however 
held that state criminal process worked serious injustice only 
in rare cases. . . . But the assumption was false; and as a result, 
the Court became ever-more involved in reviewing state con-
victions, failed to achieve any meaningful reform of the crimi-
nal justice system, and could reverse the occasional suspect 
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conviction only by leaving many indistinguishable ones undis-
turbed (p. 115). 
Next, according to Dripps, the Court’s selective incorpora-
tion cases of the mid-century were flawed for several reasons. 
“In a nutshell, fidelity to incorporation . . . meant betraying in-
strumental reliability concerns, prompting the Court (as we have 
seen) to compromise incorporation to the point where the 
amendments lost most of their distinctive meaning” (p. 116). To 
prove his point, Dripps criticizes Gideon, a case that enjoys the 
“unqualified and unanimous approval [of] judges, scholars, and 
ordinary citizens” (p. 116). As we all know, Gideon ruled that 
indigent defendants shall be provided free counsel when facing 
state felony charges. 
Concededly, “the constitutional right of indigent defendants 
to appointed counsel announced in Gideon provides a critical 
safeguard against unjust convictions, and a noble symbol of our 
commitment to equal justice” (p. 117). But Dripps asserts that 
Gideon “is as written both illegitimate and unwise” (p. 117). 
Gideon is illegitimate because its holding is not supported by the 
text of the Sixth Amendment. The text of the amendment pro-
vides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”34 
Dripps explains that the text “doesn’t say anything about provid-
ing indigent defendants with publicly paid counsel” (p. 117). In 
his view, “Gideon stretches the amendment to cover subsidizing 
counsel for the poor,” while at the same time restricting the 
scope of the amendment (p. 117). “Where the amendment says 
‘all,’ Gideon reduces the amendment to covering felony cases” 
(p. 117). Dripps wonders whether the Court—contrary to the 
framers’ intent—would ever “uphold a federal statute that for-
bade a misdemeanor defendant from appearing through pri-
vately retained counsel?” (p. 117). 
To be sure, Dripps believes that the result in Gideon is 
sound constitutional law. But Gideon is better supported by an 
instrumental due process model rather than “a formalistic focus 
on the textually referenced ‘assistance of counsel’” (p. 117). 
The incorporation approach necessarily failed to describe 
Gideon’s constitutional right with appropriate generality. 
There is nothing intrinsically valuable about lawyers; that is 
why subsequent cases have developed the idea, if not the real-
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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ity, that defense counsel’s assistance must be effective. In-
stead, counsel is valuable to an accused because counsel is an 
essential safeguard against unjust conviction. Gideon’s right 
was not to a lawyer, but to a trial that ran no more than some 
practically irreducible risk of falsely convicting him. . . . 
[C]ounsel is constitutionally required because without counsel 
the risk of unjust conviction rises beyond the irreducible (p. 
117). 
Practically speaking, the incorporation model neglected the 
constitutional interests of indigent defendants in another way: 
The Sixth Amendment says nothing about private investiga-
tors, expert witnesses, discovery against the prosecution, or 
any of a number of other safeguards against unjust conviction 
that may very well be at least as important as counsel in par-
ticular cases. The Court has yet to recognize that without 
these safeguards, a trial can be as wanting in due process as a 
trial without counsel. The delay in this recognition is at least 
partly attributable to selective incorporation (p. 118). 
Finally, Gideon’s reliance on the text of the Sixth Amend-
ment “has crippled serious scrutiny of how well counsel performs 
the constitutionally relevant function of defending the accused” 
(p. 118). The quality of indigent defense counsel is notoriously 
poor in many jurisdictions. Moreover, when errors occur at the 
pre-trial stage—whether through inadequate investigations, mis-
taken or suggestive identification procedures, or poor plea bar-
gaining skills—Sixth Amendment law does little to aid the de-
fendant. “[S]o long as counsel plays the losing hand well at the 
trial, there will be not finding of ineffectiveness” (p. 118). 
Dripps’ criticism of the “conservative balancing” of the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts is just as biting as his criticism of 
fundamental fairness and incorporation theory. Conservative 
balancing “combines the worst aspects, respectively, of funda-
mental fairness and selective incorporation. The interests of the 
suspect are seen through the narrow lens of the Bill of Rights, 
while the interests of the government are as wide as the horizon 
of a sympathetic judiciary” (pp. 124-25). The work product of 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has given us a constitutional 
criminal procedure regime “shot through with arbitrary distinc-
tions” (p. 125). Moreover, the pro-police and pro-government 
choices made by the “law-and-order” Justices do not promote 
the appropriate values. “[T]he conservative justices never recog-
nized that innocent people can be punished in the investigation 
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process even if they are never charged. Nor did they honor the 
preference for false negatives over false positives in the process 
of adjudication” (p. 127). 
Dripps offers several examples to support his critique, one 
being the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule in Fourth 
Amendment cases. With the ascendancy of the Burger Court, 
the exclusionary rule was characterized as a “judicially-created 
remedy,” rather than “a personal constitutional right of the per-
son aggrieved” by an illegal search and seizure.35 The Court has 
also repeatedly stated that the purpose of the rule is deterrence, 
and typically concludes that suppression of illegally obtained 
evidence has a “speculative” impact on deterring police illegal-
ity. 
For Dripps, the Court’s analysis “is illegitimate because it 
counts violations of the Constitution as desirable” (p. 127). If no 
illegality had occurred, there would be no evidence to suppress. 
Under the Court’s analysis, however, the product of unconstitu-
tional behavior is given a higher value than police obeying the 
law of the land. “To view the ‘loss’ of the evidence as a ‘cost’ 
treats the acquisition of the evidence as a gain” (p. 127). 
The illegitimacy of the Court’s reasoning “reached embar-
rassing” (p. 127) heights when the Court created the “good 
faith” exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon. 
The Fourth Amendment expressly requires that “no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”36 Leon addressed the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained via a warrant that was not sup-
ported by probable cause. The Court ruled the evidence was 
admissible if the police acted in good faith. The result in Leon 
contradicts a lesson law students learn on the first day of their 
Constitutional Law course: “The very essence of civil liberty cer-
tainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protec-
tion of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”37 According to 
Dripps: 
Because good-faith reliance on an illegal warrant also immu-
nizes the police from damage actions, the Court in effect 
eliminated all remedies for a conceded violation of the Con-
stitution. The costs of the warrant process may make the ex-
clusionary rule redundant in the warrant context; but the ele-
vation of a policy preference for evidence over a constitutional 
 35. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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preference for privacy is clearly illegitimate (pp. 127-28, foot-
notes omitted).38
D. FIXING THE PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
AN INSTRUMENTAL DUE PROCESS MODEL WILL HELP  
SOLVE MANY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF  
CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Chapter Six outlines Dripps’ framework for reforming con-
stitutional criminal procedure. The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides the foundation for his constitutional theory. Although 
equal protection norms noticeably influence Dripps’ thinking, 
“the heart of the theory is the connection between the tradi-
tional meaning of due process and the instrumental theory of 
procedure” (p. 131). While portions of Dripps’ thesis are men-
tioned throughout the book and developed and refined over 
many pages of analysis, there are two main components to his 
framework for deciding constitutional criminal law cases. First, 
there is a substantive element. “[T]he theory holds that the po-
lice may not deprive individuals of their liberty in the name of 
law enforcement unless the severity of the deprivation bears a 
reasonable relationship to the prospect of preventing or punish-
ing an offense” (p. 131). The second element is a wide-ranging 
procedural requirement. “[T]he theory holds that those accused 
of crime be given the opportunity for an instrumentally reliable 
trial” (p. 131). Dripps’ proposal follows the Mathews v. Eldridge 
test for framing the proper inquiry for instrumental reliability 
during adjudicatory procedure. But the procedural element 
would also regulate police investigations “because the reliability 
of the trial often turns on the reliability of the antecedent inves-
tigation” (p. 132). 
Dripps is not deterred by the obvious fact that his theory 
represents a significant departure from the way the Court cur-
rently decides constitutional criminal law cases. He asserts that 
the upshot of the Court’s preoccupation with the Bill of Rights’ 
procedural provisions has “very much narrowed the meaning of 
the Bill of Rights,” while also causing “a grave disservice to in-
nocent suspects” (p. 138). Dripps convincingly notes: 
 38. For an interesting and lively debate on Leon and its impact on police officers 
see Donald A. Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); Steven Duke, Making 
Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986); and Donald A. Dripps, More on Search Warrants, 
Good Faith, and Probable Cause, 95 YALE L.J. 1425 (1986). 
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Pretrial procedure can leave the criminal defendant facing er-
roneous but now entrenched identification testimony, without 
the benefit of exculpatory physical evidence the police ne-
glected to collect or preserve, defended by an overworked 
lawyer with no time to conduct a new investigation. This can 
(and does) happen, without any unreasonable searches, with-
out any compelled testimony, and without any denial of coun-
sel. The distinction between investigation and adjudication is 
far less palpable than current doctrine admits (pp. 138-39). 
Nor is Dripps troubled by the claim that his instrumental 
model discounts historical practices and federalism concerns. He 
concedes that the Rehnquist Court’s current emphasis on 
“founding-era common-law practice” and “delicate attitude to-
ward state prerogatives” may be appropriate when litigants bring 
substantive due process challenges against state legislation in 
civil proceedings (p. 141). But Dripps insists that these concerns 
are inapt in a procedural due process analysis. “If criminal pro-
cedure should be about correctly determining guilt and inno-
cence, constitutional doctrine should speak the language of pro-
cedural due process” (p. 141). Finally, he opines that “there is 
really a much stronger case for applying Mathews in criminal 
case than in administrative cases” (p. 141). While legislatures 
possess the political authority to create administrative entitle-
ments, they have “no discretionary power to create or to destroy 
constitutional liberty” (p. 142). Put simply, judges owe no defer-
ence to police investigation practices and state adjudicatory pro-
cedures that threaten or extinguish an individual’s “liberty.”39
 39. Later in Chapter Six, Dripps argues that: 
[L]egislative work in the criminal-procedure field deserves more distrust than 
deference. The legislative record on preventing false convictions and police 
abuse is embarrassing. Legislatures have not adopted even minimal regulations 
of identification procedures, have not provided anything like adequate support 
for indigent defense, and have, in the great majority of jurisdictions, even now 
not yet required the recording of interrogations or consent searches. Yet legisla-
tures have repeatedly conferred broad powers on police, and, by constantly in-
creasing already severe penalties, have given prosecutors enormous discretion-
ary power (p. 150). 
The political bottom line is that: 
[P]ro-government criminal-procedure legislation injures members of groups 
with relatively little political power, and it benefits groups with relatively strong 
political power. Legislatures have repeatedly demonstrated their sensitivity to 
these incentives. Instead of deferring to legislative choices made against this 
background, the federal courts should, consistently with the Carolene Products 
footnote and the representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review, face up to 
reality. If the federal courts tolerate unreliable trial procedures or police abuse, 
nobody else is going to stop it (pp. 150–51). 
For a detailed account of Dripps’ views on why legislatures intentionally neglect the civil 
liberties of criminal suspects and defendants, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, 
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How would Dripps’ theory differ from the other constitu-
tional theories he criticizes? His instrumental approach would 
differ from the fundamental fairness model in three ways. First, 
Dripps is less concerned with whether a claimed liberty or pro-
cedural safeguard is “fundamental” to our government’s system 
of order liberty; instead, his focus is on procedural due process. 
“With respect to adjudicatory procedure this focus is easy to 
maintain, but complications arise when procedural due process 
analysis confronts police investigations” (p. 143). The instrumen-
tal model would evaluate police practices like search and sei-
zures by asking: is the intrusion “justified by the prospect of pre-
venting and/or prosecuting criminal offenses?” (p. 144). If the 
police intrusion is motivated as a freestanding social control 
measure, the question becomes: is the restraint “narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest?” (p. 144). 
Second, Dripps’ instrumental model “would be far more de-
terminate, far more sharply focused, than the inquiry into fun-
damental fairness” (p. 145). For example, police practices would 
be judged by determining whether the police “deprived the sus-
pect of liberty without a sufficient expectation of exposing or 
preventing crime,” or whether the police “conducted the investi-
gation in a way that prevented the suspect from having a fair 
trial” (p. 145). If an adjudicatory procedure was challenged, “the 
issue would be simply whether the state procedure exposed the 
defendant to an unnecessary risk of false conviction” (p. 145). 
The third and final difference between Dripps’ theory and a fun-
damental fairness regime is that an instrumental model “would 
not proceed on a case-by-case basis.” Instead, following the ex-
amples of Miranda and Terry v. Ohio, “the general requirements 
of procedural due process would be translated into constitutional 
doctrine as general rules” (p. 145). 
Dripps’ model would mark a significant change from the se-
lective incorporation approach of the last fifty years. An instru-
mental model would be far more circumspect in its use of the 
Bill of Rights. It would accentuate the provisions that promote 
fair trial values. “To the extent that those provisions frustrate 
Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a 
Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1993) (argu-
ing that “legislators undervalue the rights of the accused for no more sinister, and no 
more tractable a cause than that a far larger number of persons, of much greater political 
influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential crime victim, rather than the 
perspective of a suspect or defendant”). 
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the ends of justice without protecting the innocent against false 
conviction, they should not be enforceable against the states un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 146).40 On the other hand, 
Dripps’ model is likely to mean greater regulation of the pre-
trial and adjudicatory phrases for both state and federal proce-
dures. “For example, due process might provide the predicate 
for at long last imposing some sensible regulations on the proc-
ess of developing eyewitness identification evidence” (p. 146). 
Lastly, an instrumental model differs from conservative bal-
ancing. Dripps believes that the current Court’s pro-government 
position in criminal procedure cases is “a hangover from sub-
stantive due process adjudication” (p. 150). A shift to a proce-
dural due process regime would eliminate the “legitimacy” prob-
lem of judges overruling legislative choices on nothing more 
than the type of “fundamental” rights analysis used in cases like 
Lochner and Roe v. Wade.41 At the same time, Dripps envisions 
his approach as promoting federalism. 
In at least one respect a procedural due process regime, even 
one applied with a rigorous scrutiny by the federal courts, 
would greatly strengthen the structure of federalism. A pro-
cedural due process regime could free the states from those 
Bill of Rights provisions that do nothing to prevent unfair tri-
als or police excesses. This would restore a considerable de-
gree of state autonomy over criminal procedure. Fair trials 
and proportionate police practices can take different forms. 
As it stands, criminal-procedure law is now a monolith (p. 
151). 
PART II: DRIPPS ON POLICE INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS 
This part of the review focuses on police interrogation and 
the Court’s efforts to regulate it. Dripps has some provocative 
views on the subject. This section describes the problems Dripps 
sees in the confession cases, his proposal for solving some of 
 40. The apparent neutrality of his model is impressive: 
If the individual can show that his trial ran a needless risk of false conviction, or 
that the police investigation punished him independently of any conviction, the 
state should not be heard to plead compliance with the Bill of Rights as an ex-
cuse. If, by contrast, the individual fails to show anything unfair about his trial, 
or any unjustified restraint or violence during the investigation, the Bill of 
Rights should not be converted into a loophole (p. 147). 
 41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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those problems, and my response to Dripps’ alternative constitu-
tional vision of confession law. 
A. CONFESSION LAW IS “DYSFUNCTIONAL AS WELL AS 
INCOHERENT” 
An entire chapter of the book—Chapter Four—is devoted 
to examining how the Supreme Court has shaped (and mis-
shaped) police interrogation practices and the law of confes-
sions. In Chapters Five and Six, Dripps describes how his in-
strumental due process model would apply to police 
interrogation, an area of law which has occupied the Court’s at-
tention and generated enormous controversy for the Court since 
the 1930’s.42 This is a fascinating part of the book, particularly in 
light of the author’s previously published views on police inter-
rogation and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination. In an earlier article, well-known among criminal 
procedure professors, Dripps explains that he is against police 
interrogation as it is currently practiced in America, and against 
the privilege against self-incrimination.43 In his book chapter, 
Dripps skillfully identifies the many flaws and contradictions 
that plague confession law. Indeed, Dripps finds little to praise 
about the Court’s cases and concludes that “current law is dys-
functional as well as incoherent” (p. 97). Three examples high-
light Dripps’ criticism: 
First, under the fundamental fairness regime, the admissibil-
ity of a state criminal defendant’s confession was governed by a 
due process “voluntariness” test, rather than the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Self-Incrimination Clause. From 1936 to the early 1960’s 
 42. Although many of the Court’s confession cases over the decades have been sub-
jected to harsh and penetrating criticism from both the right and left, compare JOESPH D. 
GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993), with YALE KAMISAR, POLICE 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980), ironically, the 
Court’s first case to reverse a state criminal conviction because the confession was co-
erced has generally received high praise. That case was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278 (1936). For praise of Brown, see Morgan Cloud, Torture and Truth, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1211 (1996). 
 43. Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation – And the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988) [hereinafter, 
Dripps, Foreword]. Dripps has analyzed the Fifth Amendment privilege and police inter-
rogation in other articles. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal 
Procedure: Miranda, Dickerson, and the Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1 (2001); Donald A. Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Pro-
posed Fifth Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19 (2000); Donald A. Dripps, 
Self-Incrimination and Self-Preservation: A Skeptical View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 329 
(1991). 
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the “voluntariness” test mandated consideration of the all of the 
circumstances surrounding the confessions, including the sus-
pect’s subjective characteristics as well the willingness of police 
to use violence. Such an open-ended standard, according to 
Dripps and many others, left “[l]ower courts, police officers, and 
commentators . . . never sure of which foci of the test was more 
important—the subjective capacity of the suspect to resist police 
pressure, or the objective tendency of the police methods to 
cause a typical suspect to confess” (p. 71). Under this test, “even 
physical violence to the suspect was never declared per se uncon-
stitutional” (p. 72, footnote omitted). 
Second, Escobedo’s reliance on the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel to protect a suspect’s constitutional rights during 
interrogation, in effect, “implied the end of police interrogation” 
(p. 75). If a suspect could consult with defense counsel at his will, 
police interrogators could no longer count on the psychological 
pressure and the secrecy that made pre-trial questioning an ef-
fective tool for the police and prosecutors. “Only the extraordi-
nary decision in Miranda, accepting an uncounseled waiver of 
counsel in a situation where the suspect needs counsel, saved po-
lice interrogation from the jaws of Escobedo” (p. 76, footnote 
omitted). Although Miranda removed “the fangs of Escobedo,” 
according to Dripps, Miranda itself contained an inherent con-
tradiction: 
The Miranda Court’s waiver doctrine is plainly at odds with 
the rest of the opinion. As Justice White demanded in dissent, 
“if the defendant may not answer without a warning a ques-
tion such as ‘Where were you last night?’ without having his 
answer be a compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his 
negative answer to the question of whether he wants to con-
sult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will ap-
point?” The majority made no answer (p. 81).44
 44. While other scholars agree with Dripps that Miranda’s waiver theory is inco-
herent, see, e.g., H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 195–97 (1988) (arguing that “if 
a confession given in police custody is necessarily coerced, so is a waiver”); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 454 (1987) (asserting that the 
“notion that police-initiated warnings can ‘dispel’ the compulsion [of police interroga-
tion] seems dubious at best”), at least one scholar takes a positive view of the way in 
which the Miranda Court discusses the issue of waiver. According to Professor John 
Parry: 
The availability of waiver—effectively a limit on the remedy created by the 
warnings—allows a reading of Miranda that deemphasizes the right to remain 
silent and to be free in general of the compulsion inherent in interrogation. 
With waiver, the Court concluded police interrogation is constitutionally per-
missible despite the fact that compulsion is inherent in it, and it may even have 
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Third, the conservative Justices of the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts displayed their own contradictions when it 
came to interpreting Miranda. Although the conservative Jus-
tices believed that Miranda was wrongly decided, “one index of 
the conflict between conservative criminal procedure and con-
servative judicial method is that until the year 2000 no justice 
had ever issued an opinion that urges overturning that decision” 
(p. 86). In the interim, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts issued 
opinions like Harris v. New York,45 Michigan v. Tucker,46 New 
York v. Quarles,47 and Oregon v. Elstad,48 that could not be rec-
onciled with Miranda, and rested on the premise that the result 
in Miranda was not constitutionally compelled.49
The best example of the Court’s “judicial hypocrisy” (p. 88) 
in the confession cases is Dickerson v. United States,50 which “has 
done more to confirm, than to dispel, the impression that the 
Miranda cases are irreconcilable” (p. 95). In that case, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals seized on holdings and state-
ments from cases like Harris, Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad, indi-
cating that Miranda was not compelled by the Constitution, to 
uphold the constitutionality of Title II of the 1968 Crime Control 
Bill, which had purported to overrule Miranda by statute. That 
statute, 18 U.S.C. §3501, had made the admissibility of a confes-
sion turn solely on whether a statement was voluntary. Writing 
for a seven-Justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist overruled 
the Court of Appeals, held that Miranda was a constitutional rul-
ing, and that Miranda controlled the admissibility of statements 
made during police interrogation in state and federal courts. But 
the Chief Justice’s opinion also made clear that rulings like Har-
ris, Tucker, Quarles and Elstad were still good law. According to 
Dripps, the Chief Justice’s opinion “is utterly conclusory” (p. 
believed that some compulsion is desirable. Miranda thus implements, perhaps 
imperfectly, a broad conception of fairness in criminal investigation—a better 
atmosphere for suspects but without hamstringing legitimate police attempts to 
solve crimes. 
John Parry, Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation after Chavez v. Mar-
tinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 812–13 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
 45. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
 46. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
 47. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
 48. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 49. See also DRIPPS (p. 126) (“A Court that was truly bound by Miranda would not 
have decided Harris, [Michigan v.] Mosley, and Quarles.”). 
 50. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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96), and there is no sign that a future opinion will remove the 
contradictions and tensions in confession law. 
B. APPLYING INSTRUMENTAL PROCEDURAL DUE  
PROCESS TO POLICE INTERROGATION 
How would Dripps solve the problems that plague confes-
sion law? In Chapters Five and Six, Dripps provides an alterna-
tive framework for fixing the problems he sees. First, Dripps 
notes that the “most difficult challenge to any critic of Miranda 
is to overcome all the bad arguments other critics have made 
against that decision” (p. 119). Miranda’s critics incessantly ar-
gue that police interrogation, free of judicial obstacles, can help 
solve violent crimes and identify and convict perpetrators that 
might otherwise go unpunished. “Undoubtedly this point is true, 
but those who make it never face up to the contradiction, im-
plicit or explicit, in squaring the objection with the Constitu-
tion. . . . [C]ritics of Miranda fail to reconcile the desire for evi-
dence with the right to remain silent” (p. 119). 
On the other hand, Miranda’s defenders fail to come to 
grips with the inconsistency in Miranda itself which “inexplicably 
allows the accused to make a ‘knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary waiver’ of the right to silence under the very same pressures 
that are thought to constitute compulsion in the first place” (p. 
119). According to Dripps, waiver is so common that “Miranda 
has not diminished significantly the effectiveness of police inter-
rogation” (p. 119, footnote omitted). Ultimately, the crucial issue 
raised by Miranda “is how to prevent police brutality without 
giving up confessions” (p. 120). 
Dripps’ instrumental procedural due process model would 
permit “rational regulation of police questioning—recording re-
quirements, time limits, and so on” (p. 147). Interestingly, his 
model would also allow lawyers in the interrogation room. 
Lawyers obviously impair the ability of the police to obtain 
Miranda waivers. The bottom-line reasoning for not recogniz-
ing the right to counsel until the commencement of formal 
proceedings is that the Fifth Amendment privilege means that 
the only practical window for interrogation is the period fol-
lowing arrest but preceding the appointment of coun-
sel. . . .Once the suspect’s rights are defined in terms of in-
strumental procedural considerations—that is, calculated to 
protect the innocent but not to shield the guilty—the fear of 
lawyers would abate (p. 148). 
!MACLIN-REVIEWACRIMINALPROCEDUREREGIMEBASEDON.DOC 5/9/2006 5:31:44 PM 
224 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:197 
 
 
Dripps acknowledges the need to close the “window of virtual 
lawlessness—between the arrest and the filing of charges” (p. 
181), and understands that counsel’s presence is an effective way 
to do so. But there is a price for counsel’s presence. Under 
Dripps’ model a suspect could be questioned—either by a judge 
or the police—in counsel’s presence, and even retain the right to 
remain silent, subject, however, to a permissive adverse infer-
ence at trial (pp. 148, 181). 
Obviously, the holding in Griffin v. California 51 is an obsta-
cle to implementing Dripps’ reform of confession law. Griffin 
ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination barred adverse 
comments from either the judge or prosecutor to a jury about a 
defendant’s failure to testify at trial. As Dripps explains, Griffin 
rested on at least two concerns. One, “an innocent defendant 
may refuse to testify at trial because of the fear of impeachment 
with prior convictions” (p. 181). Second, the Court felt certain 
innocent defendants—the timid or the nervous—if forced to tes-
tify at trial, might do themselves more harm than good when at-
tempting to explain on the witness stand “transactions of a suspi-
cious character” or some prior offense.52
Dripps’ rebuttal to Griffin’s concerns is two-fold. First, he 
would ban prosecutors’ use of prior offenses for impeachment 
purposes when defendants testify at trial. The defense would 
also enjoy “the right to introduce . . . pretrial testimony without 
opening the door to impeachment with prior convictions” (p. 
181). Second, he believes that the problems associated with timid 
and nervous innocent defendants will be diminished if their tes-
timony is taken before trial. “If the accused makes a misstep out 
of confusion or ignorance, there is time to take corrective action. 
For example, a motion might be made to exclude the pretrial 
statement as unreliable, or to reopen the pretrial proceeding so 
the defendant could put in additional clarifying testimony” (p. 
182). Dripps contends that police interrogation under his pro-
posal would “greatly reduce the risk of innocent suspects falsely 
incriminating themselves,” and “end the ability of sophisticated 
offenders to permanently insulate themselves from humane 
questioning” (p. 182).53
 51. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 52. Id. at 613 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)). 
 53. Dripps opines that his proposal “might be sustainable” under Griffin, but does 
not elaborate why. He does, however, emphasize the benefits of his proposal for both the 
defense and prosecution. The accused would benefit because “the right to counsel could 
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C. DRIPPS’ MODEL FOR POLICE INTERROGATIONS WILL 
BENEFIT THE PROSECUTION WHILE DISADVANTAGING THE 
DEFENDANT  
Critiquing this proposal would be a lot easier if one could 
characterize Dripps as a “law-and-order” guy, hell-bent on 
eliminating the few remaining restrictions that currently apply to 
police interrogations. But Dripps’ skeptical views on police in-
terrogation practices and confessions are well-known. For exam-
ple, he has noted “[a]ny expectation that truly voluntary confes-
sions are available on a systemic basis depends either on 
unsupportable factual assumptions or on an interpretation of 
voluntariness that reduces that word to signifying no more than 
the absence of third degree methods.”54 He has also opined that 
“[t]ypical police interrogation surely constitutes compulsion in 
any sense of that word,”55 and that confessions amount to “de 
facto guilty pleas” absent the “complete understanding of the 
consequences and alternatives” that the Court requires for de 
jure guilty pleas.56 Furthermore, Dripps has convincingly argued 
that “Miranda does no more (indeed, it does significantly less) 
than take the Fifth Amendment seriously. Every argument 
against Miranda applies with greater strength to the privilege in 
general.”57 Many of these views are repeated in his book. 
Finally, if applied to the law of confessions, Dripps’ instru-
mental model would provide greater protections for suspects 
than previous proposals for judicially supervised interrogation, a 
concept that has often been proposed to cure the abuses associ-
ated with police-dominated interrogation.58 And Professor Yale 
Kamisar, Miranda’s strongest and most articulate defender, has 
characterized proposals for judicially supervised interrogation 
less protective than the one outlined by Dripps “as inherently 
stronger than the Miranda requirements, at least as the latter 
have generally been applied.”59
be extended to the moment of arrest” (p. 182). The government would benefit because it 
could afford to file charges promptly, and would be allowed to “to take prompt, cross-
examined, videotaped depositions from the witnesses” (id.). 
 54. Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 700. 
 55. Id. at 725 (footnote omitted). 
 56. Id. at 704. 
 57. Id. at 728. 
 58. Proposals for judicially supervised interrogation have been around since the late 
1800’s. See Yale Kamisar, Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of the Accused” Forty Years 
Later—Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 15 n.3 (1974). 
 59. Id. at 37. Because Dripps’ proposal incorporates many of the concerns of 
Miranda’s defenders, Professor Kamisar’s comments are worth quoting in full: 
Assuming arguendo that the comment on the suspect’s silence authorized by 
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Although Dripps is no fan of police interrogation (or the 
Fifth Amendment), he does believe that interrogation is an es-
sential police practice that society cannot do without.60 He be-
lieves that an instrumental due process regime would permit fair 
and reasonable interrogation without tolerating lawless discre-
tion or police abuse. Generally speaking, under a model that fo-
cuses on procedural values, “a very powerful case can be made 
for requiring the taping of interrogations, including the admini-
stration of the Miranda warnings and the suspect’s waiver” (p. 
185). Specifically, as already noted, Dripps would permit access 
to counsel from the moment of arrest, and permit a suspect to 
refuse to answer police questions, conditioned on a trial court’s 
authority to draw an adverse inference of guilt from the ac-
cused’s refusal to speak during any pretrial confrontations with 
the police or prosecutor. Ultimately, Dripps model is designed to 
have police interrogations practices “calculated to protect the 
innocent but not to shield the guilty” (p. 148). 
I agree with many of Dripps’ conclusions about the Court’s 
criminal procedure doctrine. I also share his skepticism that ex-
isting police interrogation methods routinely produce “volun-
tary” confessions, and wholeheartedly endorse his critique of the 
modern Court’s Miranda rulings, particularly his criticism of 
Dickerson. That said, I cannot embrace his alternative vision for 
confession law. 
[previous proposals for judicial interrogation] exerts significantly greater “com-
pulsion” to speak than that allowed to operate under Miranda—the informal 
pressure to “avoid looking guilty” when confronted by anyone in authority un-
der any circumstances and the additional “compulsion” inherent in police cus-
todial surroundings—the comment feature should not be judged and con-
demned in a vacuum. It is only a small part of an attractive package whose 
provisions for judicial warnings, judicial supervision of any ensuing interroga-
tion, and objective recording of the entire proceeding seem inherently stronger 
than the Miranda requirements, at least as the latter have generally been ap-
plied. Not only [do previous proposals for judicial interrogation] go a consider-
able distance toward investing the interrogation proceedings with the “protec-
tive openness and formalities of a court trial,” but [they] “tend to promote the 
speedy production of the suspect before a magistrate,” offer[ ] “the most effi-
cient way of providing legal counsel upon arrest,” and “meet the equal protec-
tion argument; the rich man and the professional criminal could no longer re-
main silent without adverse consequences.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 60. DRIPPS (p. 120) (noting that “in Miranda the central question is how to prevent 
police brutality without giving up confessions”); Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 724 
(“What we are looking for is an interpretation of the Constitution that allows interroga-
tion but that does not depend on rejecting constitutional value judgments.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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For starters, Dripps’ proposal creates a serious strategic di-
lemma for criminal defense lawyers. If a suspect has access to 
counsel from the moment of arrest—a reform Dripps recognizes 
as necessary to close “a window of virtual lawlessness” that cur-
rently exists between the arrest and the filing of charges—no 
competent lawyer will advise her client to talk with the police, 
even assuming that the lawyer believes a client’s claim of inno-
cence.61 A skilled lawyer is going to conduct her own investiga-
tion before she allows her client to speak with law enforcement 
officials, and even after such an investigation, some lawyers 
never permit their clients to talk with the police. But under 
Dripps’ proposal, such a strategy has a significant cost—an ad-
verse inference at trial. From a lawyer’s perspective, this is a 
“damned if you do, damned if you don’t” choice. Nor will the ac-
cused be better positioned to second-guess his lawyer’s advice, 
whatever the lawyer advises him to do. The only side that bene-
fits is the government. In the unlikely event that the lawyer ad-
vises her client to speak, the police may obtain an incriminating 
statement or evidence that can later be used against the ac-
cused.62 And if the accused refuses to answer any questions, an 
adverse inference can later be raised at trial. 
Of course, under Dripps’ proposal, the innocent accused 
could refuse to answer questions, go to trial subject to an adverse 
inference, and then take the stand to explain why he did not talk 
to the police at an earlier occasion. This too, is a very risky strat-
egy. Professor Stephen Schulhofer has cogently detailed some of 
the practical reasons why a lawyer would not put her client on 
the witness stand: 
 61. See, e.g., F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL 
TECHNIQUES § 1:12, at 1–17 (2002) (“The most important discussion you will ever have 
with your client in a criminal case will be the initial interview. . . . You cannot emphasize 
enough the absolute necessity that your client not speak with anyone, particularly law 
enforcement agents.”) (emphasis added). 
 62. Dripps contends that securing the accused’s statement before trial advantages 
the defense. “If the accused makes a misstep out of confusion or ignorance, there is time 
to take corrective actions. For example, a motion might be made to exclude the pretrial 
statement as unreliable, or to reopen the pretrial proceeding so the defendant could put 
in additional clarifying testimony” (p. 182). Such an opportunity to clarify the record may 
provide cold comfort for lawyers and their clients. If the accused talks to the police and 
makes an incriminating statement, or makes a statement that leads to incriminating evi-
dence, query whether such statement can be later excluded as “unreliable.” Certainly any 
physical evidence obtained as a result of the statement will not be considered “unreli-
able.” Further, if the accused “makes a misstep out of confusion or ignorance” during a 
pretrial confrontation with the police, why would his lawyer run the risk of returning her 
client to the stand to provide “clarifying testimony”? And even if other witnesses could 
provide additional clarifying information, wouldn’t the judge or jury want to hear from 
the accused himself to explain what he meant during his initial statement to the police? 
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There are likely to be suspicious transactions or associations 
that your innocent client will have to explain. But he may 
look sleazy. He may be inarticulate, nervous or easily inti-
mated. His vague memory on some of the details may leave 
him vulnerable to a clever cross-examination. Most ordinary 
citizens find that being a witness in any formal proceeding is 
stressful and confusing. The problems are bound to be height-
ened when the witness happens to be on trial for his life or his 
liberty. Some people can handle this kind of situation, but 
others, especially if they are poor, poorly educated or inar-
ticulate, cannot. They may handle the trial experience poorly 
whether or not they are guilty.63
Furthermore, assume that a lawyer advises a client to speak 
with the police. What steps may the police or prosecutor then 
take to elicit a statement from the accused? Would the police be 
permitted to exert greater pressure on the accused because he 
has spoken with counsel and counsel is present? “What if the 
suspect started to show signs of weakening? Should the [interro-
gator] keep up the pressure, to get a confession? Or should he 
ease off so that he would not overbear the suspect’s will? The 
due process approach in effect instructed the officer to do 
both.”64 Furthermore, what types of police trickery are permissi-
ble under an instrumental procedural regime? Can the police lie 
to the accused? The same issues and conflicts that existed (and 
still exist)65 under the due process voluntariness test will surface 
whenever the police interrogate the accused, with or without 
counsel being present. 
To be sure, Dripps’ proposal cannot be dismissed because it 
fails to anticipate every factual scenario that might arise in the 
interrogation context. The pace and direction of an interroga-
tion, just like the factual issues that may arise during police ques-
tioning, are not likely to be anticipated by the accused (or his 
counsel). The key point is that a police interrogation, with or 
without counsel, is not designed to be a “fair hearing” for the ac-
cused. In fact, there is nothing at all “fair” about police interro-
 63. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 330 (1991) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Some Kind 
Words]. 
 64. Id. at 326 (footnote omitted). 
 65. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F. 2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 
(1986) (finding that a police interrogation was not coercive and incriminating statements 
given by defendant were voluntary under due process even though interrogation ended 
when the defendant collapsed into a catatonic state and was transported to the hospital). 
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gation, at least from the accused’s perspective.66 It is a confronta-
tion where the police hold all the cards but one, which is why 
lawyers always advise their clients not to talk. Silence is the one 
card that the accused retains. 
Second, Dripps’ entire instrumental due process theory is 
based on the premise that criminal procedure rules should seek 
to punish the guilty and protect the innocent. As he puts it, 
“[u]nless constrained to do so by constitutional authority, crimi-
nal procedure should not place obstacles in the way of punishing 
the guilty except to the extent that those obstacles protect the 
innocent” (p. 110). This premise is evident in his proposal on po-
lice interrogation. Surely an innocent person will talk with the 
police, particularly in the presence of counsel. After all, what 
does an innocent person have to lose by talking with the police? 
Only the guilty will have an incentive not to talk. And that in-
centive will be lessened by the ability of the judge or prosecutor 
to draw an adverse inference at trial about the defendant’s pre-
trial silence. 
An innocent person, however, can lose his liberty by talking 
to the police. Silence can protect the innocent, as well as the 
guilty. As recent empirical studies show,67 and countless stories 
in the national press reveal, innocent people sometimes do con-
fess to crimes they did not commit.68 Admittedly, Dripps ac-
 66. Dripps is well aware of this fact: “It should be remembered . . . that police inter-
rogation is not a deposition. It is, as the case may be, manipulative, confrontational, or 
fraudulent” (p. 129). 
 67. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544–46 (2005) (finding that between 1989 and 2004, 
fifty-one defendants confessed to crimes they had not committed: “[o]ne defendant 
falsely confessed to larceny; nine falsely confessed to rape; and forty-one . . . falsely con-
fessed to murder”). See also, Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of 
False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psy-
chological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 478 (1998) (analyzing the 
consequences of false confessions on defendants in a study of sixty cases where the police 
induced confessions out of suspects later proven innocent, and where the confession was 
otherwise unsupported by any reliable evidence; “In practice, criminal justice officials 
and lay jurors often treat confession evidence as dispositive, so much so that they often 
allow it to outweigh even strong evidence of a suspect’s factual innocence.”); Steven A. 
Drizin & Richard A Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 891, 892 (2004) (examining 125 cases of false confessions induced by police 
interrogation and concluding that “the problem of interrogation-induced false confession 
in the American criminal justice system is far more significant than previously sup-
posed”). 
 68. See, e.g., Charges Dropped After no DNA Match: Police Will Try to Find Killer, 
BELVILLE NEWS DEMOCRAT, Jun. 20, 2005, at B3 (Police say father of murdered girl 
admitted to staging her death to look like an abduction after killing her accidentally. The 
father was released from custody after DNA evidence fails to link him to the crime); 
Sharon Begley, Interrogation methods can elicit confessions from innocent people, WALL 
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knowledges that “[s]ome innocent persons confess under [the] 
pressures” of interrogation, and that “many more are needlessly 
subjected to them” (p. 129, footnote omitted).69 And he suggests 
that his proposal “would greatly reduce the risk of innocent sus-
pects falsely incriminating themselves” (p. 182). But the best 
guarantee against false confessions is silence.70 If suspects do not 
talk to the police, they greatly reduce the chances that a false 
confession will be admitted into evidence at a subsequent trial.71
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at B1 (“of the first 130 exonerations that the New York-based Inno-
cence Project obtained via DNA evidence, 85 involved people convicted after false con-
fessions”); Fred Grimm, Another failure of justice system, MIAMI HERALD, Jun. 8, 2003, 
at 1 (man spends 12 years in prison based on false confession and is later exonerated by 
DNA evidence); Tim McGlone, Judge wants new suspect in killing identified; DNA 
cleared man convicted of ’82 crime but implicated another, whose identity is secret, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & STAR LEDGER, Aug. 22, 2003, at B4 (mildly retarded man who was 
convicted and received death sentence based on his false conviction was exonerated 
based on DNA evidence); Jean M. Templeton, Shutting Down Death Row, AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, Jul. 1, 2004, at A8 (mentally ill man gave a videotaped confession to his 
mother’s murder. He was later released after DNA testing pointed to another suspect); 
Christopher Wills, False Confessions: Taping interrogations won’t protect suspects from 
themselves, ASSOCIATED PRESS ALERT, July 17, 2005 (man who confessed to a hit and 
run that killed his girlfriend released after a year in jail when physical evidence proved 
that he could not have committed the crime; expert says innocent suspects often give re-
alistic confessions because they are able to glean facts from those the police give during 
prolonged interrogations). 
 69. See also DRIPPS (p. 97) (noting that at “least a few [suspects] who waive their 
[Miranda] rights end up confessing to crimes they did not commit”). Apparently, Dripps 
has retreated from his earlier view that the privilege merely protects against a “purely 
hypothetical risk to the innocent” defendant, and that there are “no real cases in which 
the privilege protects an innocent defendant.” Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 716. 
 70. Cf. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 329 (“Supporters of the 
privilege never claim that it is essential for most innocent defendants or that it helps the 
innocent more than the guilty. The claim is only that the privilege helps many innocent 
defendants and that acquitting these innocents is more important than convicting an 
equal or somewhat larger number of guilty defendants.”). 
 71. Of course, even when suspects choose not to talk with the police, they run the 
risk that the police will manufacture fake evidence and induce guilty pleas for crimes the 
suspects did not commit. The LAPD Rampart Scandal became a prime example of the 
way in which innocent people are often pressured into confessing to crimes they did not 
commit. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing With Police 
Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 306 (2001) (due to the 
corruption of LAPD officers who fabricated evidence and gave false testimony, 
“[i]nnocent men and women plead guilty to crimes they did not commit and were con-
victed by juries on the basis of fabricated cases.”); Valerie Alvord, Police scandal in LA 
puts convictions in doubt, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1999, at A4 (Lawyer advised his client 
to plead guilty despite the client’s protests that he had been falsely accused—the man 
was convicted, but later proclaimed innocent when it was found that he was a victim of 
the LAPD Rampart corruption scandal); Peter J. Boyer, Bad Cops, NEW YORKER, May 
21, 2001, at 60, 70–72 (Noting that LAPD “bad cop” turned informant, Rafael Perez, 
provided investigators with information about how LAPD officers had framed suspects 
and falsified information which led to the arrests and convictions of over a hundred inno-
cent men, most of whom plead guilty); Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
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The innocent suspect who chooses silence, however, will pay 
a price under Dripps’ proposal. The suspect who refused to 
speak with the police will be confronted with his silence, and his 
judgment to remain silent will be used against him. At trial, such 
a defendant will be compelled to counter the judge or prosecu-
tor’s72 use of his prior “testimony”: 
Compulsion arises directly from the trial court’s willingness to 
use the defendant’s own testimony against him, against his 
will. The “testimony” is the defendant’s communicative act 
(like a nod or a shrug), his physical response to the implicit 
question, “How do you explain this evidence against you?” In 
effect, the defendant’s implicit  response is placed in evidence 
to support an inference about his own knowledge and state of 
mind.73
Ironically, though intended to protect innocent persons, ap-
plication of Dripps’ proposal might actually hurt the innocent 
suspect. Empirical data plainly shows that innocent suspects 
have harmed themselves by talking with the police. Because they 
chose to talk with the police, some of these suspects have been 
charged, convicted and imprisoned for crimes that they did not 
commit. Although a competent attorney would not advise her 
2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 36 (Commenting on how he and others had framed innocent 
people, Officer Rafael Perez claimed “that in Rampart Crash it was commonplace to set 
up gang members on weapons and drug charges. He added that such tactics had the ap-
proval of his commanding officer . . . In his interviews with police investigators, Perez 
made clear that he saw nothing wrong with setting up gang members.”); Linda Deutsch, 
Man framed by LAPD Freed; Scandal: DA’s Office Says as many as 40 cases under re-
view, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Nov. 19, 1999, at A18 (Man who pleaded no con-
test to possession for sale of cocaine base and controlled substances was proclaimed in-
nocent and released from jail after LAPD officers were found to have planted evidence 
on the man); Ted Rohrlich, Scandal shows why innocent plead guilty, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
1999, at A1 (“In offering criminal defendants these kinds of . . . choices [between plead-
ing guilty and receiving a lesser sentence and risking trial and getting the maximum sen-
tence], prosecutors and judges did not set out to induce innocent men to plead guilty—
although that is what they did. The prosecutors and judges merely accepted the word of 
the Los Angeles police that the men were guilty.”). 
 72. It is not clear whether Dripps would permit both judge and prosecutor to com-
ment at trial on the suspect’s pretrial silence (pp. 148, 181). The distinction is not trivial. 
As Professor Peter Arenella explains with regard to a defendant’s trial silence: 
[O]nce one grants that the defendant’s trial silence constitutes probative evi-
dence that the jury may consider, the prosecutor should be permitted to com-
ment on such evidence during her closing argument. The only argument for 
prohibiting prosecutorial comment—that the jury may give such silence undue 
weight after listening to the prosecutor’s summation—is less than compelling. 
Erroneous eyewitness testimony probably is responsible for most convictions of 
the factually innocent, but such a reliability problem does not generate a rule 
that only the court can comment on its probative value. 
Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1245 n.28 (1996). 
 73. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 334–35. 
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client, innocent or not, to talk with the police without conducting 
her own investigation, Dripps’ proposal burdens the attorney 
and client with the difficult task of rebutting the client’s earlier 
silence. As Professor Schulhofer has explained, an innocent de-
fendant will often choose silence at trial “because his judgment is 
that testifying will increase the chances of conviction.”74 The 
same is true for the innocent defendant who chooses silence at a 
pretrial confrontation with the police. Dripps’ proposal, how-
ever, will inevitably compel some innocent defendants to testify 
at trial. And the innocent defendant who is forced to testify at 
trial to explain his pre-trial silence will be in the same risky posi-
tion already described by Professor Schulhofer. “A decision to 
compel their potentially unreliable testimony involves not only 
the ever-present risk of convicting the innocent, but also a seri-
ous problem of fairness. . . . [T]he concern is with the predica-
ment of an innocent defendant who fears he will be manipulated, 
intimidated or misunderstood.”75
Finally, if fairness (or fair procedure) is a legitimate value to 
promote, why focus only on the innocent suspect? Dripps readily 
acknowledges that police interrogation can be “manipulative, 
confrontational, or fraudulent” (p. 129), that under current doc-
trine “[r]ecording requirements, time limits, and the prohibition 
of particularly sub dolis interrogation tactics have proved the 
road not taken” (p. 97), and that “because of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, there is a gap—a window of virtual lawless-
ness—between the arrest and the filing of charges” (p. 181). 
I suspect that Dripps would also agree that the current sys-
tem of police interrogation does little to protect the interests of 
innocent suspects, other than to inform them of their right to 
remain silent and the right to have counsel present during an in-
terrogation. Putting that fact aside, however, are guilty suspects 
not equally entitled to the concerns acknowledged by Dripps? 
From an instrumental perspective, why should guilty suspects be 
subjected to “manipulative, confrontational, or fraudulent” in-
terrogation practices? If “[r]ecording requirements, time limits, 
and the prohibition of particularly sub dolis interrogation tac-
tics” are important features under an instrumental regime, 
shouldn’t these safeguards be equally available to guilty sus-
pects? Finally, why should guilty suspects be subjected to “a 
 74. Id. at 331. 
 75. Id. at 332. 
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window of virtual lawlessness—between the arrest and the filing 
of charges”? 
Dripps’ instrumental procedural due process model would 
disincorporate the privilege as applied to the states, but would 
retain (and add) crucial procedural safeguards of modern con-
fession law, including Miranda warnings, the right to refuse to 
answer questions, and the requirement that a suspect knowingly 
and voluntarily waive his rights. Dripps insists that his proce-
dural model would significantly reduce the chances of false con-
fessions by innocent suspects and “end the ability of sophisti-
cated offenders to permanently insulate themselves from 
humane questioning” (p. 182). To be sure, Dripps’ discussion of 
his proposal does not contain the disdain some scholars and 
commentators have shown for the Court’s interpretation of the 
privilege.76 Nevertheless, Dripps’ proposal to reform confession 
law, like others before him, has a tone that suggests that guilty 
suspects are less deserving of constitutional protection than in-
nocent suspects. 
Although he would no longer make the privilege applicable 
to the states, interestingly, Dripps does not disavow a suspect’s 
right to refuse to answer police questions during interrogation. 
In fact, he appears to endorse the right, subject to an adverse in-
ference at trial. As I have already explained, that position makes 
the right to silence meaningless. Dripps’ proposal would also ef-
fectively eliminate the right to stop custodial interrogation, an-
other crucial, but often ignored, component of Miranda. But as-
suming Dripps does not intend to make the right to silence 
pointless, aren’t guilty suspects equally entitled to a meaningful 
interpretation and application of a right that Dripps does not 
deny them? 
Put another way, if all persons, the guilty and innocent 
alike, have a right to remain silent, should not that right count 
for something when the state brings criminal charges against 
them? The right to silence deserves respect, at both the pretrial 
and trial stages. This means that guilty suspects will be able to 
“insulate themselves from humane questioning” if they so 
choose.77 It also means that guilty defendants who choose silence 
 76. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Taking the Fifth Too Often, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2002, at A15; Mickey Kaus, The Fifth Is Now Obsolete, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1986, at 
A15. For a detailed discussion of Professor Amar’s views on the Fifth Amendment, see 
Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995). 
 77. Professor Richard Leo’s empirical work indicates that experienced criminals are 
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at trial will be rolling the dice in terms of what the jury may infer 
from their silence.78 But respect for the right to silence, whether 
asserted at a pre-trial confrontation with the police or at trial, 
does not permit a court to “solemnize[] the silence of the ac-
cused into evidence against him.”79
If Dripps agrees with me (as I suspect he does) that the right 
to silence is worthy of respect,80 then respect must be afforded to 
all suspects, both innocent and guilty, who confront police inter-
rogation. Dripps’ proposal for judicial or “humane” police ques-
tioning of the accused provides for access to counsel, Miranda 
warnings, and a meaningful waiver of the right to silence. Dripps 
believes that such a system will provide an effective mechanism 
for interrogation without the manipulation, coercion, and abuse 
that currently plagues the system. But Dripps’ proposal, with 
these safeguards, assumes a right to silence, which, of course, is 
the core protection provided by the Fifth Amendment’s privi-
lege. Over a time, such a system might have developed from 
principles derived from the Due Process Clause (particularly if 
five Justices had Dripps’ attitude toward police interrogation 
and confessions), but the Fifth Amendment privilege is a more 
direct way to the same endpoint. 
On the other hand, one can imagine a pro-police critic of 
Dripps’ proposal arguing that a principled interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause would not have supported the “detailed 
code of interrogation rules” favored by Dripps.81 While I agree 
less likely to talk with the police during custodial interrogation. See Richard A. Leo, In-
side the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286 (1996) (“[A] sus-
pect with a felony record in my sample was almost four times as likely to invoke his 
Miranda rights as a suspect with no prior record and almost three times as likely to in-
voke as a suspect with a misdemeanor record.”). 
 78. Of course, Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), held that a trial judge, when 
requested to do so by the defendant, must give a cautionary instruction to the jury not to 
draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s refusal to testify. 
 79. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 335. 
 80. In an earlier article, Dripps brought to my attention an important fact that I had 
overlooked in many years of studying Miranda. He pointed out that two of Miranda’s 
harshest critics, Professors Fred Inbau and Gerald Caplan, in articles condemning 
Miranda, had never “urge[d] abolishing the right to silence in the face of police question-
ing nor denie[d] its existence in positive law.” Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 714 
n.63. See Fred E. Inbau, Over-Reaction—The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. 
REV. 1417 (1985). 
 81. See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 42, at 120: 
Although the rights that Miranda created were unprecedented in federal consti-
tutional law, the Court’s conclusion that the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
from compulsory self-incrimination is “fully applicable during a period of cus-
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with Dripps that a due process model could support the proce-
dural safeguards he favors, I do wonder why such safeguards are 
mandatory on the states if the Fifth Amendment privilege does 
not require them.82
Fundamentally, Dripps and I agree that there is an “inevita-
ble tension that exists in the simultaneous commitment to police 
interrogation and to the privilege against self-incrimination.”83 
Miranda did not resolve this tension.84 If anything, Miranda high-
lighted the conflict between the privilege and police interroga-
tion, and initially left one side of the debate—police officials and 
their political defenders—angry at the Court for interfering in 
the first place. Because Dripps believes that confessions and po-
lice interrogation are necessary components of a well-
functioning criminal justice system, he would resolve the tension 
between interrogation and the privilege by making the privilege 
no longer binding on the states. 
The Fifth Amendment should remain binding on the states 
not because “guilty” suspects should be immune from “humane” 
questioning. Rather, the Fifth Amendment should bind state of-
ficials because there is a need to restrain police interrogations 
directed at both guilty and innocent suspects.85 A constitutional 
todial interrogation” was perhaps even more significant from a jurisprudential stand-
point. By thus leaving the due process “totality of circumstances” approach behind, 
the Court enabled itself to fashion a detailed code of interrogation rules that due 
process jurisprudence could never have supported. Moreover, by shifting consti-
tutional gears from Fourteenth Amendment due process to Fifth Amendment 
self-incrimination, the Court avoided the need formally to overrule decades of 
due process precedent that had rejected litmus tests for the admissibility of con-
fessions. 
 82. See Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 327 (noting that critics of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege who favor a regime of judicial questioning of the accused 
under oath, but also favor restraining or prohibiting outright police interrogation of the 
accused, “never quite explain how that result could be achieved without the Fifth 
Amendment in place, or why it should be achieved if the Fifth Amendment is basically 
unsound”). 
 83. Thomas, supra note 6, at 823. I believe Dripps agrees with this assertion because 
he has previously recognized the conflict that exists between the Fifth Amendment and 
police interrogation. Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 727–28 (“The Court’s efforts to 
enforce the Fifth Amendment necessarily entail a morally unjustifiable loss of evidence, 
while its efforts to preserve police interrogation because of its evidentiary value necessar-
ily entail a legally unjustifiable derogation of the constitutional decision to include the 
privilege in our fundamental law.”). 
 84. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 883–84 (1981) 
(“Miranda does not, any more than the due process test, come directly to grips with the 
dilemma arising from our simultaneous commitments to the privilege against self-
incrimination and to a law enforcement system in which police interrogation is perceived 
as a necessity.”). 
 85. A noted critic of the Fifth Amendment privilege, Professor David Dolinko, also 
seems unwilling to abolish the privilege, in part, because “Miranda and its progeny have 
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standard or rule based on due process, as applied by the current 
Court, will not protect against the same abuses, trickery, ma-
nipulation, and “compelled” choices that the Fifth Amendment 
bars. 
Applying the privilege to the states may have been a “radi-
cal break” from precedent,86 but the Warren Court’s shift from a 
due process model to a Fifth Amendment model to regulate po-
lice interrogation was intended, inter alia, to provide greater pro-
tection for suspects, because the due process regime was not 
working. “Miranda had brought Fifth Amendment standards 
into the stationhouse under the expressly stated assumption that 
those standards provided more protection than the traditional 
Fourteenth Amendment protections.”87 The due process model 
barred confessions that were “coerced” or “involuntary,” while 
the Fifth Amendment barred “compelled” statements. Although 
the current Court often treats these terms as interchangeable,88 
they have very different meanings under the law of confessions. 
As Professor Kamisar explains: 
When we talk about a “coerced” or “involuntary” confession, 
we mean a confession that is inadmissible under the pre-
Miranda due  process/totality of circumstances test because, as 
the courts usually put it when they apply such a test, taking 
into account the totality of circumstances, the confession was 
not a “product of free choice” or “free will” but one where 
the defendant’s will was “overborne” or “broken.” More op-
pressive methods were needed to render a confession “co-
erced” or “involuntary” under the pre-Miranda test for the 
admissibility of confessions than are necessary to make a con-
fession “compelled” within the meaning of the self-
made the privilege the principal basis for constitutional limitations on police interroga-
tion practices.” David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1986). 
 86. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence Of 
Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 949 (2001) [hereinafter, Schul-
hofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism]. Professor Schulhofer also notes that “no mem-
ber of the Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas included, shows any inclination” to disin-
corporate the privilege. Id. See also GRANO, supra note 42, at 122–23 (responding to 
Dripps’ earlier proposal to disincorporate the privilege, noting that such a proposal “is 
likely to be perceived as too radical, or too late in the day, to garner majority support on 
the Court”). Justice Scalia, however, has questioned the historical pedigree and logic of 
Griffin, and Justice Thomas has stated that “Griffin and its progeny . . . should be reex-
amined.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 
341–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 87. Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, supra note 86, at 950. 
 88. Letter from Professor Yale Kamisar to Tracey Maclin, May 4, 2005 (on file with 
author). 
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incrimination clause. That, at least, is the premise of Miranda. 
And that, at least, appears to have been the understanding of 
everyone involved in the case.89
Miranda, of course, significantly changed the constitutional 
calculus by bringing the privilege into the stationhouse. Miranda 
meant greater protection for suspects facing custodial interroga-
tion because, as Professor Schulhofer explains, the “Fifth 
Amendment itself sweeps more broadly than the due process rule 
against involuntary statements.”90 And, as Schulhofer goes on to 
note, the Fifth Amendment protects against the use of a com-
pelled statement “even when the compelled statement is not in-
voluntary within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”91
If adopted by the courts, Dripps’ instrumental due process 
model will most likely result in a return to the involuntariness-
totality of the circumstances test that existed pre-Miranda, albeit 
with the presence of counsel at judicially supervised interroga-
tion sessions. Although never expressly stated, Dripps must be-
lieve that if his proposal was adopted, a few lawyers would ad-
vise their clients to speak with the police during a pre-trial 
interrogation session. And in order to secure the continued par-
ticipation of police and prosecutorial officials, a certain amount 
of aggressive and/or deceptive questioning would have to be 
permitted. Certainly law enforcement officials would not con-
tinue participating in an investigative procedure dominated by 
defense counsel or one in which their questions were met with a 
refusal to respond. Otherwise, why would law enforcement offi-
cials participate? Under Dripps’ proposal, however, the Fifth 
Amendment would no longer be the benchmark for judging the 
constitutional validity of statements and evidence obtained dur-
ing a pre-trial interrogation session. The admissibility of any 
statement or evidence would be measured by the due process 
clause. 
In sum, from the perspective of the accused, Miranda is no 
panacea. But Miranda affords significantly more protection than 
 89. Id. See also Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, supra note 86, at 950 
(“Starting with [Michigan v.] Tucker, [417 U.S. 433 (1974)], the Court took the teeth out 
of incorporation by asserting that compulsion meant nothing different from involuntari-
ness after all. If valid, that claim leaves one to wonder what all the fuss was about in 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and why Justices Harlan and Clark so passionately 
argued, in dissent, that only Fourteenth Amendment involuntariness, not freedom from 
Fifth Amendment compulsion, should be required of the states.”). 
 90. Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, supra note 86, at 946. 
 91. Id. 
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that provided by the Due Process Clause. If the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege no longer applied to state officials, and police in-
terrogation was judged by an instrumental due process model, 
criminal defendants would have less protection than they have 
today. True, defense counsel would be available at the moment 
of arrest. But counsel would face the Catch-22 of letting her cli-
ent talk with the police, or endure an adverse inference at trial. 
Under such a regime, the right to silence would mean very little, 
if anything. The admissibility of statements or evidence obtained 
pursuant to custodial interrogation would be determined by due 
process standards. If the reasoning and result in Colorado v. 
Connelly is an indication of how the Court would apply due 
process norms, then someone like Dripps, who is concerned with 
the reliability of confessions, is not likely to be pleased with the 
Court’s application of instrumental due process.92
 92. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), held, inter alia, that the Due Process 
Clause does not require the suppression of a confession given by a person who suffered 
from chronic schizophrenia, “command hallucinations,” and was in a psychotic state at 
the time he made his confession. Connelly explained that “[a]bsent police conduct caus-
ally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor 
has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.” The Court conceded that Con-
nelly’s confession might be “quite unreliable,” but explained that reliability is a matter of 
state evidentiary laws, and not a concern of the Due Process Clause. 479 U.S. at 164. 
Connelly reveals the type of results conservative Justices are willing to tolerate. 
Suppression of incriminating evidence should be avoided at all costs, even if it means the 
admission of unreliable evidence. As Professor Laurence Benner has perceptively ex-
plained: 
[S]urely this is the (exclusionary) tail wagging the (due process) dog, for the up-
shot of the Court’s position is that unless exclusion will deter someone in an of-
ficial capacity, there can be no due process violation no matter how unjust the 
result. By allowing the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule to control 
the nature of the due process inquiry, the Court thus permits the logic of deter-
rence to shape the actual content of due process itself. Under this formula any 
concern for justice is excluded from the equation. Indeed, any attempt to de-
velop a coherent theory of justice under the due process clause is precluded. 
Laurence Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine 
in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 136–37 (1989). 
The two most recent Miranda rulings from the Court, decided after Dripps’ book 
was published, United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 
U.S. 600 (2004), will also give cold comfort to those who think a due process regime, ap-
plied by conservative Justices, will be a better method to regulate police misconduct. In 
Patane, a plurality held that a failure to provide Miranda warnings does not require the 
suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements. 
Seibert ruled that when police deliberately fail to give Miranda warnings at the outset of 
interrogation, obtain an incriminating statement, and then later give the warnings, a 
“second” statement from the suspect, which is essential a replay of the earlier statement, 
is inadmissible. While space limitations preclude a full critique of Patane and Seibert, it is 
sufficient to note the following: “The obvious danger of Patane is that the Court created 
a new incentive for police officers to violate Miranda. After Patane, rational police offi-
cers will ignore Miranda whenever the large and immediate benefits of obtaining in-
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CONCLUSION 
Professor Dripps closes his book expressing the hope that 
his book has provided his readers with something to think about. 
Dripps quotes H.L.A. Hart: “Of [Jeremy] Bentham, Hart wrote 
that even where he ‘fails to persuade, he still forces us to think.’ 
If I have achieved this much, this study will have succeeded be-
yond my fondest hopes” (p. 189).93 After giving his book two 
careful readings, I can say without hesitation that Dripps has 
successfully accomplished that mission. Dripps’ book is essential 
reading for anyone interested in constitutional criminal proce-
dure. Whatever one’s political persuasion, reading Dripps’ book 
will force them to think anew about how the Supreme Court 
constructs constitutional criminal procedure. 
criminating physical evidence outweigh the possible harm to some future prosecutor of 
exclusion of a statement (but not the physical evidence) in the unlikely event that the 
case goes to trial.” Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why The New Missouri 
v. Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 395–96 (2005). 
Nor will Seibert, in the long run, act as a restrain on deliberate misconduct during police 
interrogations. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Seibert, which provided the fifth vote in 
that case, made plain that he would have admitted Seibert’s second confession had the 
police undertaken certain “curative measures.” 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment). There is no hint in either Patane or Seibert that the defendants’ state-
ments would have been deemed “involuntary” for purposes of due process. In fact, the 
Patane plurality repeatedly emphasized that Patane’s statement was “voluntary,” and 
Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court in Seibert specifically left unaddressed “the actual 
voluntariness” of Seibert’s second statement. 542 U.S. at 617 n.8. For an excellent cri-
tique of Patane and Seibert, see Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and 
Seibert, the 2004 Miranda “Poisoned Fruit” Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2004). 
 93. Quoting H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 39 (1982). 
